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Executive summary 
Prior research shows that accounting conservatism exists in mature economies. However 
there is not too much research about accounting conservatism in transitional economies. 
This paper analyses the influence of institutional and political factors on accounting 
conservatism in Eastern European countries which have already joined the European Union. 
I researched the levels of unconditional and conditional conservatism in Eastern Europe 
and compared them with Western European results. I did not find evidence that there is 
conditional conservatism in Eastern Europe. My research shows that there was conditional 
conservatism only in Poland during the analyzed period. I found significant evidence 
proving my expectations regarding the influence of the quality of law, securities law and 
the risk of expropriation on conditional conservatism. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5781.  
 
1. Introduction 
Most of the post-communist European countries have already joined the European Union. 
What is important is that the European Union intends to harmonize accounting regulations 
across member countries by implementing International Accounting Standards. However, 
prior research proves that the differences remain despite common regulations due to 
political and institutional factors specific to certain countries. 
Conservatism in accounting has been researched for many years. The results regarding 
Western European countries and the United States prove the existence of conservatism in 
accounting. In contrast to the West, not all post-communist countries were subjects of the 
research and institutional factors which can influence conservatism are not fully explored 
in the case of these countries. The objective of the research is: 
 
                                             
1 This paper is based on my master thesis, completed in 2009 as part of the master Accounting Auditing & Control at 
Erasmus University Rotterdam under supervision of Dr. Y. Wang, reviewed by Dhr. Rob van der Wal. Since September 2009 
I have worked as an Associate in PricewaterhouseCoopers. In the future I am going to continue an academic carrier. 
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To analyze conservatism in accounting in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which are members of the European Union and to identify institutional factors 
which have an influence on conservatism in these countries 
 
The main research question is:  
Is there accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe? 
 
The research sub-questions are as follows:  
• Does accounting conservatism differ across Eastern Europe? 
• Do institutional factors influence accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe?  
• Did the transitional process influence accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe?  
 
My research contributes to prior research for a couple of reason. First of all Eastern 
European countries are rarely the subject of an analysis, secondly I used the Basu model in 
my analysis, third I explored the influence of institutional factors on accounting 
conservatism in this region. The results of this paper are important for all users of financial 
reporting to give them the possibility to assess the quality of accounting figures, especially 
in debt and management employment contracts. I found evidence that there is 
unconditional conservatism in both analyzed regions but it is higher in Western Europe than 
Eastern Europe. The results for conditional conservatism show that there is no 
conservatism in Eastern Europe (excluding Polish observations) but there is in Western 
Europe. Three Eastern European countries were analyzed in detail and I found that only in 
Poland for the whole analyzed period there is conditional conservatism. I found evidence 
proving my expectations regarding the influence of the quality of law on conditional 
conservatism, security law and risk of expropriation. I found significant evidence, which 
contradicted my expectations regarding transitional progress and tax burden; however I 
found reasons justifying these outcomes. I did not find significant evidence regarding my 
hypothesis about the influence of equity market exposure. 
 
2. Accounting conservatism  
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define accounting conservatism as a situation when on `average 
book value is lower than market value. Basu (1997) defines conservatism as the 
incremental timeliness of bad news recognition over good news recognition. Basu (1997) as 
news means returns; he justifies it, by saying that in an efficient market, stocks 
incorporate all available information immediately. He assumed that the response of 
earnings  to bad news is quicker than its response to good news. Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
examine conservatism from the point of view of changes in earnings, cash flows and 
accruals; they give another definition of conservatism based on the characteristics of a 
conservative reporting system, which tends towards the early and full recognition of 
unfavourable events in the financial statements and the delayed and gradual recognition of 
favourable events, and then conservatism can be measured by skewness or the variability 
of the earnings distribution. Givoly and Hayn (2000) also use another approach in 
measuring conservatism which is based on features of accruals. They explain that accruals 
tend to reverse, when there is a period, when income exceeds (is lower than) cash flow 
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and is followed by a period, when income is lower than (exceeds) cash flow. Conservatism 
takes place, when negative accruals tend to persist over time in stable companies. This 
measure is based on the definition of conservatism, in which the accounting system results 
in “slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset valuation and 
higher liability valuation”, this definition incorporates elements of earnings conservatism 
(revenue and income) and balance sheet conservatism (assets and liabilities).  
 
3. Literature review  
3.1 The existence of conservatism and trends 
One of the most important papers from the field of conservatism in accounting is “The 
conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings” of Basu (1997). First of 
all Basu proved that the regression coefficient is higher for a sample which included 
observations with negative unexpected returns than positive ones, it means that earnings 
is more timely in recognition of publicly available “bad news” than “good news”. Basu 
(1997) examines also conservatism from accruals point. He found out that regression 
coefficient for bad news is higher for earnings than for CFO, but for good news there is no 
difference between R2’s, which is consistent with accounting conservatism incorporated in 
accruals. The next issue which Basu (1997) examines is the persistence of earnings. He 
proved that negative earnings have a higher tendency to reverse in the future than positive 
earnings. Basu (1997) also examines one of the reasons why there is an increase in the 
level of conservatism. He analyzed the relationship between auditors’ liability and the 
coefficient of bad news and good news with earnings, and he finds that there is a 
relationship between this correlation and the level of auditors’ liability. He founds that in 
periods of higher liability exposure for auditors there is higher a coefficient between bad 
news and earnings, and the coefficient between good news and earnings in the last period 
of high legal liability.  
Givoly and Hayn (2000) widely prove that there was conservatism in accounting during the 
analyzed period. First of all they found out that in the early period (1966-1980) the 
companies generated slightly positive net accruals, and since 1982 net accruals have been 
negative. Accumulation of negative non-operating accruals is consistent with an increase in 
reporting conservatism over the last several decades. The other groups of measures like 
the earnings-return measures indicate an increase of conservatism overtime. The earnings 
distribution is negatively skewed in most of the examined periods and there is no similar 
phenomenon in cash flows. The negative skewness of earnings confirms the existence of 
conservatism and an increase of the skewness, which means an increase in conservatism 
over time.  
 
3.2 International differences  
The research of Giner and Rees (2001) focuses on three close European countries Germany, 
France and the UK. They found that the strongest conservatism was in the UK and then in 
France and Germany. However all three countries express an association of bad news with 
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returns which is much stronger than good news and returns. The differences between these 
three countries are however not significant.  
Ball et al. (2000, 4) extend previous studies by going beyond just comparing different 
accounting regimes but focusing on institutional factors. Ball et al. (2000) study 
international differences between Australia, Canada, UK, USA, France, Germany and 
Japan. Ball et al. (2000) show that in common law countries with a so called shareholder 
orientation there are stronger incentives for conservatism, on the other hand code law or 
stakeholder oriented countries are characterized by less conservative accounting. They 
found out that in code law countries there is less conservatism then in common-law 
countries.  
Garcia Lara and Mora (2004) find that  both balance sheet and earnings conservatism 
practices exist in all countries examined, but there are significant differences in 
conservatism between countries. The market-to-book ratio in the UK is significantly 
different from the other countries. In all analyzed countries there is a significantly faster 
recognition of bad news in earnings with respect to good news. Lara Garcia and Mora 
(2004) indicate that the United Kingdom is the most extreme example in Europe (common-
law-based country), which shows greater earnings conservatism than other analyzed 
countries 
Raonic et al. (2004) focused on a different group of companies. They take for their analysis 
all companies across Europe which have been listed on more than one capital market 
between 1987-1999 (366 firms and 3 724 firm-year observations) using Basu model to 
measure conditional conservatism. The three factors considered are: equity market 
exposure and regulatory environment. Raonic et al. (2004) conclude that capital market 
pressure and regulatory impact each appears to lead to more conservative accounting. 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) analyzed the period between 1999-2001. They analyzed 38 
countries. They used the Basu model in their research incorporating legal and institutional 
factors as dummy variables. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) find out that in the strong 
judicial system countries bad news is recognized faster than in countries with lenient  
judicial systems. Secondly, they find that strong public enforcement aspects of securities 
law slows recognition of good news in earnings relative to firms in countries with weak 
public enforcement aspects. In contrast, the private enforcement aspects of securities law 
have no impact on conservatism. Less conservatism in accounting is observed in countries 
with greater political involvement and a high risk of expropriation of assets by the state 
and high state ownership of enterprises 
Evidence regarding one of the countries of Eastern Europe can be found in Jindrichovska 
and McLeay (2005). Jindrichovska and McLeay used the Basu model to measure 
conservatism in the Czech Republic. They did not find proof for the existence of 
accounting conservatism in the Czech Republic. This phenomenon Jindrichovska and 
McLeay explain due to economic transition and regulatory conditions that limit market 
influences on accounting behaviour.  
The most recent paper about Eastern European countries is “Reliability of earnings figures 
and conservatism in transitional economies” by Martikainen and Tilli  (2007). The results of 
the research show that in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Latvia and 
Slovakia there is conservatism at a significant level. Conservatism in the Czech Republic 
and Ukraine is insignificant. The research also shows that joining the EU has a significant 
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positive influence on loss recognition, it means EU members are more conservative than 
non-EU ones. They also researched the influence of the transition process. They found out 
that those countries in which progress in the transition process is more thoroughly 
developed express higher conservatism, at the significant level. 
 
4. Hypotheses and research design 
4.1 Hypotheses development 
H1: There is unconditional conservatism in post-communist countries  
Capitalism has existed in post-communist countries for almost twenty years. During this 
period these countries were able to create institutional frameworks similar to Western 
European countries. All these changes allow it to be said that Eastern European countries 
have already created mechanisms typical for a market economy and that is why I can claim 
that unconditional accounting conservatism takes place in Eastern European countries.  
 
H2: Conditional and unconditional conservatism is stronger in Western-European countries 
than in post-communist countries  
Despite big progress made by post-communist countries in the transition process, full 
transformation from a command market to a free market economy cannot be done within 
such a short period of time. The market economy tradition in Western countries was built 
over decades, and it is not possible to repeat the same process in such a short time. On top 
of that, some countries like Slovenia or the Slovak Republic did not go through the 
transition process so fast. consequently it was expected that accounting in post-communist 
countries is less conservative than in Western European countries.  
 
H3: There are differences in the level of conditional conservatism in Eastern European 
countries  
Taking into account individual countries, it is reasonable to say that the countries despite 
a common communist tradition are different due to differently executed transition 
process. Countries had different approaches towards carrying out the transformation 
process. The Czech Republic was the quickest in privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Poland chose a more gradual method of privatization, while Hungary tried to attract 
outside investors, which could buy state-owned enterprises. Beside their different ways of 
carrying out the transitional process, different factors like the size of capital markets, 
regulatory frameworks, and tradition (Polish accounting was relatively flexible already 
before 1990) can also determine dissimilar levels of conservatism in Eastern European 
countries. Based on the progress in the transitional process, regulatory framework, and the 
size of capital markets, I can expect that  conservatism would be expressed the most in 
Poland and the lowest level of conservatism should take place in the Czech Republic.  
 
H4: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with more progress in the 
transitional process  
Progress in the transitional process as shown in various analyses differs greatly (source 
European Bank of Development and Reconstruction, Structural Change Indicators, 
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http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm ). This can have an 
influence on accounting practices, since countries, which went faster through transitional 
process have an approach more similar to Western countries, which means that they could 
demonstrate a higher degree of conservatism.  
 
H5: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with higher market 
exposure  
Strong market exposure of companies is connected with the risk of litigation by investors. 
Companies which are listed on capital markets are exposed to litigation in the event that 
they mislead investors. Then, managers are especially cautious about their accounting 
policy. It is expected that higher market exposure causes a higher level of conservatism in 
accounting.  
 
H6: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with a strong legal system  
I could expect that the extent that the legal/judicial system is conducive to the use of 
enforceable contracts, there will be higher conservatism, due to a need for verifiable 
accounting figures by contracting parties. The role of the judicial system is to maintain the 
enforceability of contracts. This means that countries with a stronger judicial system 
(which lead to the use of accounting numbers in formal contracts) are characterized by a 
higher demand for conservative reporting. 
 
H7: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with strong securities laws  
Regulatory bodies are exposed to public judgment, which is more unfavourable in the 
event of overstatement of accounting numbers than understatement. Then regulatory 
bodies tend to create laws which encourage conservatism. Furthermore, the costs of strong 
security law (which regulates relations between market players) are smaller than 
individual contracts, thus security law responds to contracting incentives. The last, strong 
security law is connected with some non-criminal penalties but also criminal ones (if it is 
built into the framework of national law), this causes accounting to be even more 
conservative. All these reasons lead me to believe that I should expect that the quality of 
security law is connected with level of accounting conservatism.  
 
H8: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries, where there is a high risk of 
expropriation  
It is claimed, that government aims to control enterprises due to market imperfections 
such as monopoly power, to provide employment and subsidies. The state wants to control 
poor performing companies for the benefit of the greater society. I expect that the 
relation between risk of expropriation and conservatism is positive, so the higher level of 
this risk signifies a higher level of conservatism in accounting.  
 
H9: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with strong tax regimes  
It was expected that companies in countries with high tax burdens, in order to avoid tax 
payment will exercise conservatism. In this case I can state the above hypothesis should be 
true. It is understandable that companies want to avoid paying taxes. In order to diminish 
the value of income taxes, companies try to underestimate earnings which is characteristic 
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of conservatism. On the other hand, the situation of post-communist countries is a little 
bit different, because tax authorities in these countries have a strong position and try to 
prevent these kinds of practices in companies. This opposite stream in the tax regime of 
post-communists countries could result in  the relationship between tax regimes and 
accounting conservatism to be opposite to what I expect. 
 
4.2 Research design 
In the first stage, unconditional and conditional conservatism are measured in Western 
European countries and post-communist countries as by two pooled samples. The sample of 
Western Europe consists of companies from France and Germany. For post-communist 
countries observations from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Poland were taken to do the computation. The Basu model and market-to-book ratio are 
measures, which were used in this research.  
 
Accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe. Comparison with Western Europe  
In the first stage, two measures of conservatism are used: Basu model and market-to-book 
ratio.  
The model of Basu is used in order to measure earnings conservatism.  
NIt=α0 + α1DRit + β0Rit + β1R*itDRit+εit (1) 
NI it – accounting income (income before extraordinary items) 
Rit - the return of firm i over the 12 months (Pt-P t-1)/Pt-1 
 
 
DRit =  1 if Rit <0 
  0 otherwise 
 
Measures of conservatism from the regression 1(Givoly and Hayn, 2000, 293): 
• β1 – incremental response to bad news relative to good news, conservatism when 
β1>0,  
• (β0 +β1 )/ β0  the relative sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared with their 
sensitivity to good news, conservatism when ratio >1 
• Rb2/Rg2 where Rb2 - R2 power of regression in periods of bad news (negative 
returns); Rg2 - R2 power of regression in periods of good news ( positive returns), 
conservatism  when the ratio >1 
In order to measure balance sheet conservatism there is used market-to-book ratio.  
MTB= MV/BV 
MV- market value represented by market capitalization  
BV- book value represented by shareholders equity  
The market-to-book ratio is calculated based on aggregated amounts of market and book 
value, where market value is sum of market capitalization of all companies in sample and 
book value is a sum of shareholder’s equity of all companies in sample. MTB>0 indicates 
the accounting conservatism.  
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Influence of institutional factors on conservatism  
The Influence of institutional factors on conservative accounting is measured by the 
incorporation of these variables into the Basu model as a dummy variable. The following 
model is constructed according to Bushman and Piotroski (2006) research.  
 
After incorporating an institutional factor the Basu model is as follows: 
NI= β1 +β2Rit + B21CCD Rit + β4RitD + β41CCD RitD 
 
After transformation, the above equation is as follows 
NI= β1 +(β2 + B21CCD) Rit + (β4 + β41CCD) RitD 
 
CCD- represents any institutional factor: transition process (TRANSP), equity market 
exposure (EQMEXP), legal system (LAW), security law (SECLAW), risk of expropriation 
(PTECON) and tax burden (TAX).  
 
Similar to Bushman and Piotroski (2006), in their research the focus will be on recognition 
of good and bad news in CCD countries relative to non-CCD countries, so the B21 + β41 are 
of great importance.  
When β21 ≠0 the speed of good news recognition differs in CCD countries relative to non-
CCD countries 
When β41 ≠ 0 incremental speed of bad news recognition relative to good news recognition 
differs for CCD countries to non-CCD countries 
 
In the model there are incorporated the institutional settings. Proxies are based on ratings 
provided by European Bank of Development and Reconstruction and World Bank in its 
annual reports. 
I have analyzed the influence of following factors on conservatism in accounting: 
• transitional process (TRANSP)  
• equity market exposure (EQMEX)  
• regulatory environment (law enforcement) (LAW)  
• security law (SECLAW)  
• political economy (PTECON)  
• tax regime (TAX). 
 
The data for research were extracted from World Scope and Thomson Financial database 
for the period 1994-2008. Market capitalization was taken as a market value (WS.YR END 
MARKET CAP ) which is Market Price-Year End * Common Shares Outstanding, book value is 
represented in database by common equity (TF.Total Common Equity common 
shareholders' interest in a company), the accounting earnings (NI) are income before 
extraordinary items (WS.IncomeBefExtraItemsAndPfdDiv- Net Income Before Extraordinary 
Items And Preferred Dividends), and dividends per share (WS.DividendsPerShare). All 
accounting variables are scaled by beginning market value of the company (WS.YR END 
MARKET CAP). Stock returns (Rit) are computed as ((Pit+Divit)-Pit-1)/Pit-1.  
Market-to-book ratio  
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All companies with missing values are excluded from the research. The number of 
observations is very low at the beginning of the analyzed period for Eastern European 
countries. The reason is that at the beginning of 90’s securities markets were not 
developed and some stock exchanges were recently established in post-communist 
countries. The number of observation for the period 1994-2008 in Eastern European 
countries is 3.003 and in Western European countries 20.901. 
Basu model  
The structure of the sample is determined by the size of the capital markets of the 
analyzed countries. According to market capitalization (World Development Indicators 
online database), the biggest securities market is in Poland. Budapest and Prague’s stock 
exchanges are similar in the size, and the capital markets with the smallest market 
capitalization are in Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania. This goes together with the structure 
of the sample. There are 2.161 observations for three Eastern European countries for the 
period 1994-2008. The data are dominated by Polish companies, which represent 60% of 
observations. The rest of the countries have the following shares: 18% Czech Republic, 17% 
Hungary, 0,6% Lithuania, 2% Slovakia and 2% Slovenian companies. Because of the 
dominance of Polish companies, a reestimation is provided of models excluding Polish 
observations. There are 18.673 observations for Germany and France for the period 1994-
2008 
 
5. Results and analysis 
Estimations of accounting conservatism across regions and countries  
My research shows that in the Western European region conservatism is stronger than in 
Eastern Europe for the analyzed period which confirms hypothesis 2 “Conditional and 
unconditional conservatism is stronger in Western-European countries than in post-
communist countries” (regarding the part about unconditional conservatism, later on 
evidence is provided about conditional conservatism). The results also show that my 
expectations about hypothesis 1 are true, there is unconditional conservatism in Eastern 
Europe. The results show also that between the three analyzed countries, Poland has the 
highest market-to-book ratio, the next one is Hungary and at the end the Czech Republic.  
Table 1 presents the outcome of the analysis regarding conditional conservatism NI=β1 + 
β2Rit + β3Dit + β4RitD for the Western European countries and Eastern European countries.  
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Table 1. Association between earnings and returns in Western and Eastern Europe  
β2, β4 and adjusted R2 presents the results derived from the following model NI=β1+ β2Rit + β3Dit + β4RitD, for country-year 
observations for years indicated in the first column. R2 bad and R 2 good are derived from the models, where bad news 
(negative returns) are regressed on accounting income and good news (positive returns) are regressed on accounting income. 
In the last column there is presented number of observations. The values of the first row of each region in the second and 
the third column present the unstandardized coefficients; values in brackets in the second row are the t-statistics.  
 
 Period β2 β4 Adj. R2 
[%] 
(β2+β4))/
2 
R2 bad R2 good N 
Western Europe 
0.021*** 0.309*** 10.9 15.71 0.089 0.006 18673 1994-2008 
(7.390) (28.801)      
0.012*** 0.292*** 11.9 25.33   9462 1994-2001 
(3.790) (22.872)      
0.035*** 0.310*** 10.4 9.86   9211 2002-2008 
(6.927) (17.754)      
Eastern Europe 
0.050*** 0.182*** 9.5 4.64 0.035 0.032 2161 1994-2008 
(6.110) (4.840)      
0.069** 0.325*** 10.1 5.71   787 1994-2001 
(2.478) (4.554)      
0.048*** 0.084 9.3    1374 2002-2008 
(6.012) (1.879)      
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
0.115*** 0.037 5.1    855 1994-2008 
(3.128) (1,069)      
0.103** -0.040 4.1    426 2002-2008 
(2.631) -(0.296)      
 
* significant on the level of 10% confidence level  
** significant on the level of 5% confidence level  
*** significant on the level of 1% confidence level  
 
There is evidence that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (measured by the β4 
coefficient) is stronger in Western European countries than in Eastern European countries 
at the 1% significance level. Results derived in this section regard hypothesis 2: 
“Conditional and unconditional conservatism is stronger in Western-European countries 
than in post-communist countries”. Both types of conservatism show a higher level in 
Western Europe. The market-to-book ratio is higher for Western Europe than for Eastern 
Europe in the Basu model’s results I conclude that Western Europe’s accounting is more 
conservative than Eastern Europe’s accounting. In fact, there is no evidence indicating 
accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe, when I exclude from a sample Polish 
observations.  
I mentioned in my objectives that I want to use two measures of accounting conservatism 
in order to check if the chosen methodology influences the results, and secondly if there 
are differences in the levels of conditional and unconditional conservatism in the analyzed 
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regions. Although results derived from the period 1994-2008 are similar, when I divide my 
sample in two periods, the results are opposite. The market-to-book ratio is higher for 
Eastern Europe than for Western Europe in the second period and results for the Basu 
model are opposite; the conditional conservatism was higher in Western Europe than in 
Eastern Europe for the second period. These opposite results I can explain due to a biased 
measure of the market-to-book ratio (Givoly and Hayn (2000). I think that the results of 
the market-to-book ratio in the second period for Eastern Europe are biased by growth 
opportunities. That is why the Basu model is a better measure of accounting conservatism.  
 
After analysing Eastern Europe as a whole sample, it is interesting to explore countries 
individually. The number of observations for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland allow 
me to conduct research separately for these countries. Table 2 reveals the outcome. 
 
Table 2. Association between earnings and returns in Eastern European countries 
β2, β4 and adjusted R2 presents the results derived from the following model NI=β1+ β2Rit + β3Dit + β4RitD, for country-year 
observations for periods indicated in the first column. R2 bad and R 2 good are derived from the models, where bad news 
(negative returns) are regressed on accounting income and good news (positive returns) are regressed on accounting income. 
In the last column the number of observations is presented. The values of the first row of each region in the second and the 
third column present the unstandardized coefficients; values in brackets in the second row are the t-statistics.  
 Period β2 β4 Adj. R2 
[%] 
(β2+β4))/
2 
R2 bad R2 good N 
Czech Republic 
0.169** 0.123 4.1 - 0.007 0.018 391 1996-2008 
(2.220) (0.580)      
Hungary 
0.072*** 0.046 12.9 - 0.013 0.046 373 1994-2008 
(2.880) (0.720)      
Poland 
0.032*** 0.178*** 12.4 6.56 0.038 0.029 1304 1994-2008 
(4.261) (4.507)      
* significant on the level of 10% confidence level 
** significant on the level of 5% confidence level 
*** significant on the level of 1% confidence level 
 
Comparing Eastern European countries, the first finding is that the timeliness of accounting 
earnings is the highest in Hungary (Adj R2). Secondly, the incorporation of good news into 
earnings is the highest for the Czech Republic and the lowest for Poland (β2). Further on, 
only in Poland there is evidence at the 1% significance level that there is asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings. The results for Hungary and the Czech Republic are insignificant; it 
means that there is no evidence of asymmetric timeliness for earnings. The relative 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared with their sensitivity to good news is higher 
than 1 in Poland (the calculation is not provided for the Czech Republic and Hungary, since 
the coefficients are not significant), and the last measure of conservatism: the relation of 
the power of the regression in periods of bad news (negative returns) to the power of the 
regression in periods of good news (positive returns) is higher than 1 only in the Polish 
case. I believe that there are two main drivers of the results obtained in Table 2. This is 
the way of handling the transitional process used by post-communist Eastern European 
countries and the tax regulations in these countries. The results for the beginning of the 
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analyzed period are determined by the first driver. In the Czech Republic a lack of an 
institutional framework around the securities market, which developed very quickly, is a 
reason for the lack of conservatism at the beginning of the period in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. Poland had a different attitude. This country firstly developed regulations 
based on western standards, which some criticized for overambitious goals, because they 
were difficult to attain for companies which recently started to learn about capital 
markets (OECD 1998). However, it was probably the most important reason why there was 
accounting conservatism in Poland and not in Hungary or the Czech Republic. Nowadays, 
the security market’s regulations have also improved in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
The results from the Czech Republic are similar to those found in a paper by Jindrichovska 
and McLeay (2007). They also found evidence that there is no asymmetric timeliness in 
earnings. The reasons for these particular results are seen in the transitional nature of the 
Czech market and restrictive tax regulations, which diminish incentives for conservatism. 
It is worthwhile to note that the Czech Republic has the highest coefficient of stock 
returns (good news), which indicates that the timeliness of earnings is the highest in this 
country. This can indicate that strict tax requirements reinforce the incentives of 
companies to recognize all events in a timely manner. The specific Czech regulations 
regard limitations on provisioning, depreciation and deferred taxation. Companies that do 
not fill the requirements (e.g. reduce their tax base) can also face penalties (Jindrichovska 
and McLeay, 2007). The results for Poland are in accordance with the paper of 
Jermakowiacz and Gornik-Tomaszewski (1998), who researched the relation of stock 
returns and earnings. They found out that this relation is similar to the mature markets 
and the results are comparable to the research conducted on the US market by Easton and 
Harris (1991). The lack of evidence of conservatism in the Czech Republic, even when I 
take more recent periods into analysis, is driven by a very strict tax system in this country. 
Overall, I can conclude that in Eastern Europe the main drivers of conservatism are 
institutional settings (like taxes and securities market regulations). In these countries the 
costs of establishing adequate regulations by market players are too high (it was hoped 
that regulations would be established by players in the Czech Republic; this was a mistake 
and the government realised that this is its role to establish a legal framework and 
regulatory bodies at the end of 90’s). The results regarding Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic confirm hypothesis 3: “There are differences in the level of unconditional and 
conditional conservatism in Eastern European countries”. These countries, despite their 
common communist past, differ in the level of conditional conservatism, and these 
differences result from the diverse way of handling the transitional process and 
establishing regulations. Poland is the most conservative country while there is a lack of 
evidence for the existence of conditional conservatism in the Czech Republic.  
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Table 3. Evidence on the influence of legal and political institutions on the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings in Eastern Europe 
The following table presents select coefficients and test statistics of estimations from the model 
NI=β1 + β2Rit  + β3Dit + β4RitD + β11CCD + β21RitCCD+β31Dit CCD + β41DRitCCD 
The sample holds observations from Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia available for period 
1994-2008. In the first rows unstandardized coefficients are presented, the second rows provide t-statistics.  
 
 Good news Incremental bad news sensitivity  
  β2 β21 β4 β41 Adj R2 
TRANSP 0.086*** -0.067*** 0.369*** -0.328*** 10.20% 
 (5.355) -(3.421) (5.675) -(3.875)  
EQMEXP 0.045 -0.064 0.242 -0.026 7.60% 
 (1.091) -(0.827) (1.671) -(0.574)  
LAW 0.038*** 0.028 0.041 0.284*** 8.10% 
 (3.815) (1.032) (0.743) (3.234)  
SECLAW 0.044 -0.003 0.314 -0.153 7.50% 
 (0.425) -(0.032) (1.313) -(0.630)  
PTECON 0.029*** 0.069*** 0.097* 0.199** 8.80% 
 (2.962) (2.569) (1.866) (2.217)  
TAX 0.075*** -0.058*** 0.369*** -0.344*** 9.10% 
  (5.357) -(3.147) (5.790) -(3.992)   
 
 
*** significant on the level of 1% confidence level 
** significant on the level of 5% confidence level 
* significant on the level of 10% confidence level 
 
Table 3 provides evidence about the relation of institutional factors and the timeliness of 
earnings. First of all the results for the transitional process are significant and they show 
that the transitional process causes lower timeliness of earnings (β2 and β21) and lower 
incremental bad news sensitivity (β4 and β41). This contradicts hypothesis 4: “Asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with more progress in transitional 
process”. The reason why the outcome for the transitional process is different from my 
expectations is that there was a negative relation between the development of capital 
markets and the speed of privatization of state-owned –enterprises, which is the main 
element of the TRANSP proxy. The rapid privatization which was the main indicator of the 
progress of the transitional process was connected with a lack of setting up proper 
regulations. On the other hand high standards for securities law was a main driver of 
conservative accounting. Furthermore, high standards constrained privatization and the 
development of private enterprises due to difficult access to capital markets, as was the 
case in Poland. 
The results for equity market exposure are insignificant, so the coefficients cannot really 
be interpreted; the reason why the outcome from equity market exposure is insignificant 
can be connected to the underdeveloped security markets in the analyzed countries. The 
securities markets are still unstable and vulnerable to outside factors (Schroder, 2000). 
This can be a reason why the results are not significant. Further on, in Blommestein’s 
paper (1998, OECD report) it is indicated that the cost of establishing regulatory bodies 
and regulations encouraging conservatism was too high. Because market development did 
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not go alongside the development of regulations.This can also be a reason why despite 
higher market exposure of the listed companies accounting conservatism was not 
encouraged Based on this result I do not find significant evidence, which proves hypothesis 
4: “Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in the countries with higher market 
exposure”. 
 
Table 3 provides evidence that countries with impartial courts (clear legal framework) 
have a higher incremental sensitivity to bad news. Since the companies face the threat of 
litigation from investors when earnings are overvalued rather than the opposite, this threat 
is more probable in countries where the legal system is clear and enforceable. It is 
reasonable that companies recognize their “bad news” quicker in countries with high legal 
standards. The result is on a significant level. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the 
influence of the legal framework on good news sensitivity since the results are not 
significant. The outcome confirms my expectations regarding hypothesis 5: “Asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with a strong legal system”. 
There is no evidence about the influence of securities law on the timeliness of earnings, 
since the results are not significant. However, there is a reason to do some further 
research by changing the construction of the dummy variable. The way it is done in 
previous analysis means that there are 79 observations with 0 values of the dummy, and 
2080 with 1. This can be a reason for the insignificant results regarding the securities 
market in the previous analysis. This modification in the construction of dummy variables 
increases the number of observations with the dummy variable value of 0 to 473. The 
results after the correction of the SECLAW dummy variable are consistent with the 
expectation stated in hypothesis 6: “Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in 
countries with strong securities laws”. Countries with high quality securities laws recognize 
good news slower, at a significant level. However, based on the results there is no 
evidence showing how securities laws influence the recognition of bad news since the 
results are insignificant. The change in construction of the dummy variable improves the 
result and confirms the hypothesis. The improvement of the dummy variable was certainly 
justifiable, since previously the observations were in the majority of instances assigned to 
the high quality of security law, and it was impossible to get significant results. 
The results regarding political economy are as follows: The sensitivity of good news is 
higher in countries with a high risk of expropriation at a 1% significance level. The result 
shows that companies operating in countries, which have a higher risk of expropriation, 
incorporate good news faster than countries with a low risk of expropriation. On the other 
hand, incorporation of bad news is also quicker in high risk of expropriation countries on 
the significance level 1% and 5%. Because post-communist countries are considered as non-
benevolent countries, states which take over companies, that perform well the higher 
coefficient β41 than β4, confirms that companies in countries with a high risk of 
expropriation undervalue their earnings by quicker incorporation of negative events. On 
the other hand, a higher β21 than β2 is not consistent with the assumption that Eastern 
European countries are non-benevolent countries. The results show that countries with 
high PTECON incorporate good news faster but that the incremental bad news sensitivity is 
also higher. Then, it is hard to asses which direction the influence of political economy is 
stronger. Based on the results I can conclude that hypothesis 7 “Asymmetric timeliness of 
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earnings is higher in countries, where there is a high risk of expropriation” is confirmed, 
because incremental speed of bad news recognition relative to good news recognition is 
higher for countries with high risk of expropriation than for countries with low risk of 
expropriation (β41).  
The findings regarding tax regime are opposite to the stated hypothesis 9 “Asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings is higher in countries with strong tax regime”, but confirm the 
expectations about the influence of this aspect on conservatism in post-communist 
countries. The result verifies that in countries with strict tax regimes, there is no 
conservatism but rather aggressive accounting (negative coefficient β41 on the significant 
level). It provides evidence that the tax regime has a significant influence on conservatism 
in post-communist countries, which confirms a brief divagation of Jindrichovska and 
McLeay (2007) about the reasons for the lack of conservatism in the Czech Republic. 
However, a high tax burden resulting in slower good news recognition may prove that tax 
regulation encourages conservatism, as expected by Bushman and Piotroski (2006). 
Nevertheless, the results show that β41 is negative on the significance level of 1%, which 
does not confirm hypothesis 9: “Asymmetric timeliness of earnings is higher in countries 
with a strong tax regime”.  
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this research is to analyze conservatism in accounting in the post-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are members of the European 
Union and to identify institutional factors which have influenced conservatism in these 
countries.  
I investigated Eastern European countries which have already joined the European Union 
and had a communist regime in the past. I measured unconditional conservatism using the 
market-to-book ratio and Basu’s conditional conservatism model. The period of my analysis 
was limited to the years 1994-2008.  
Hereafter, I will shortly recall the results of my research. First of all, my main research 
question was ”Is there accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe?”. After the analysis I 
conducted I can answer: yes, there is unconditional conservatism in Eastern Europe. On the 
other hand I found evidence confirming the existence of conditional conservatism in 
Eastern Europe (including Poland in the sample). I compared the results for Eastern Europe 
with the results for Western Europe, and I concluded that accounting conservatism is 
represented more brightly in Western European countries  
I also found answers for more detailed sub-questions in my research. Regarding my first 
sub-question “Does accounting conservatism differ across Eastern Europe?” I found that the 
level of conditional conservatism differed in the three countries analyzed. My second sub-
question was as follows: “Does the transitional process influence accounting conservatism 
in Eastern Europe?”. Hypothesis 4 was aimed at answering this question. The evidence 
shows that the progress of transition discourages conservatism. Thus it seems that the 
regulations are the main incentives for accounting conservatism in Eastern Europe. The 
results are consistent with the outcome of hypothesis 7 regarding security laws.  
My last research sub-question verifies whether institutional factors influence accounting 
conservatism in Eastern Europe. First of all I did not find significant evidence that equity 
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market exposure encourages accounting conservatism and I justify this by pointing out the 
vulnerability of equity markets in emerging markets, which overshadow the results. The 
second institutional factor which I analyzed was the quality of law. I found evidence that 
the impartiality of the legal system encouraged conditional conservatism in Eastern 
Europe, which is in accord with my expectations. After the quality of law I researched 
another regulatory aspect: security law. In this case I also found that higher standards of 
security law positively influence the level of conservatism. These outcomes were in 
accordance with my eighth stated hypothesis. I found that the risk of expropriation by the 
state discouraged conservatism. 
The results for the tax regime’s influence on conditional conservatism was opposite to my 
expectations; however it is justifiable, since high tax burdens are so strong in these 
countries. This means that companies do not try to underestimate their earnings, but 
rather they try to recognize them in a timely manner due to the danger of penalties.  
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